- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 5
- Procedurally Fair P...
Procedurally Fair Provision of Public Projects
An axiomatic characterization
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 22. März 2011
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2011-016
- Schlagwort(e)
-
Buchanan
Unanimity in Collective Decision Making
Wicksell
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a “productive state”. At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal “profits” according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- H4 - Publicly Provided Goods; H61 - Budget; Budget Systems ; D62 - Externalities ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations