- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 5
- The emergence of no...
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 2. April 2011
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2011-018
- Schlagwort(e)
-
bargaining
cooperation
experiment
normative conflict
social norms
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conflicts? While norms are widely regarded as a source for cooperation, this article proposes a novel theory in which the emergence of norms can be understood as a bargaining process in which normative conflicts explain the finally emerging norm. The theory is tested with a dynamical experiment on conflicts over the consideration of equality, effort or efficiency for the distribution of joint earnings. Normative conflict is measured by the number of rejected offers in a recursive bargaining game. The emerging normative system is analyzed by feedback cycles between micro- and macro-level. It is demonstrated that more normative cues cause more normative conflict. Further, under the structural conditions of either simple or complex situations, the convergence towards a simple and widely shared norm is likely. In contrast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely and several equally reasonable norms co-exist. The findings are discussed with respect to the integration of sociological conflict theory with the bargaining concept in economic theory.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement