- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 11
- Actions and the sel...
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 22. Dezember 2017
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2017-018
- Schlagwort(e)
-
experiments
moral wiggle room
pro-social behavior
reciprocity
self-image concerns
self-signaling
social preferences
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Self-signaling models predict less selfish behavior in a probabilistic giving setting as individuals are expected to invest in a pro-social identity. However, there is also substantial evidence that people tend to exploit situational excuses for selfish choices (for instance, uncertainty) and behave more selfishly. We contrast these two motivations experimentally in order to test which one is more prevalent in a reciprocal giving setting. Trustees’ back transfer choices are elicited for five different transfer levels of the trustor. Moreover, we ask trustees to provide their back transfer schedule for different scenarios that vary the implementation probability of the back transfer. This design allows us to identify subjects who reciprocate and analyze how these reciprocators respond when self-image relevant factors are varied. Our results indicate that self-deception is prevalent when subjects make the back transfer choice. Twice as many subjects seem to exploit situational excuses than subjects who appear to invest in a pro-social identity.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D80 - General ; D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving