- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 9
- Privacy, Trust and ...
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 1. Dezember 2015
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2015-023
- Schlagwort(e)
-
privacy
public goods
social networks
trust
- Zusammenfsg.
-
We study in the laboratory the impact of private information revelation on the selection of partners when forming individual networks. Our experiment combines a “network game” and a “public-good game”. In the network game, individuals decide with whom to form a link with, while in the public-good game they decide whether or not to contribute. The variations in our treatments allow us to identify the effect of revealing one’s name on the probability of link formation. Our main result suggests that privacy mechanisms affect partner selection and the consequent structure of the network: when individuals reveal their real name, their individual networks are smaller but their profits are higher. This indicates that the privacy costs of revealing personal information are compensated by more productive links.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory