- A-Z
- Jena Economics Rese...
- Volume 9
- Preferences-depende...
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 6. August 2015
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2015-012
- Schlagwort(e)
-
experiment
learning
Self-confirming equilibrium
social preferences
- Zusammenfsg.
-
We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent’s past behavior. We manipulate the quality of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming equilibrium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C71 - Cooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
- URN
- urn:nbn:de:urmel-1ebccbd1-8250-488b-8b1b-9f07899fff946-00242632-18