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Compulsory Disclosure of Private Information -
Theoretical and Experimental Results for the
“Acquiring-a-Company” Game
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 29. Januar 2014
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2014-003
- Schlagwort(e)
-
Acquisition of firms
disclosure of private information
experimental economics
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Based on the “acquiring-a-company” game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of information disclosure as prescribed by two recently implemented directives of the European Union, the Transparency and the Takeover-Bid Directive. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest a welfare-enhancing effect of compulsory information disclosure. Hence, the EU Transparency and the EU Takeover-Bid Directive should both be welfare enhancing.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost–Benefit Analysis ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information