- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 6
- Ranking alternative...
Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: a theoretical
and experimental analysis
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 20. Februar 2012
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2012-005
- Schlagwort(e)
-
Bidding behavior
Procedural fairness
Voting paradox
- Zusammenfsg.
-
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experiment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking is the socially efficient one. Second, subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations