- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 5
- See No Evil: Inform...
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 23. September 2011
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2011-040
- Schlagwort(e)
-
conditional cooperation
externality
incentives
information
public goods
team production
transparency
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a fully-transparent protocol in inducing cooperation under increasing returns to scale. In a comparable social dilemma, the information chain leads to high cooperation both when compared to a non-transparent protocol for early movers, and when compared to a fully-transparent protocol for late movers. we conclude that information chains facilitate cooperation by balancing positive and negative reciprocity.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects