- A-Z
- Jena Economics Rese...
- Volume 5
- Corporate Social Re...
- Author
- published
- Wed Jun 29 2011
- Number of discussion paper
-
2011-030
- keyword(s)
-
Corporate Social Responsibility
experiment
gift-exchange game
incentives
labor market
moral hazard
principal agent
- abstract
-
We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers’ motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game variant, CSR is captured by donating a certain share of a firm’s profit to a charity. We are testing for CSR effects by varying the possible share of profits given away. Additionally, we investigate the effect of a mission match, i.e., a worker preferring the same charity the firm is actually donating to. Our results show that on average workers reciprocate investments into CSR with increased effort. A mission match does result in higher effort, but only when investment into CSR is high.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D0 - General; J01 - Labor Economics: General ; M14 - Corporate Culture; Social Responsibility ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- URN
- urn:nbn:de:urmel-7191c6b4-67cf-4716-9f30-5a6522ce464f2-00233422-14