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- Jena Economics Rese...
- Volume 5
- Collectively Rankin...
Collectively Ranking Candidates : An Axiomatic Approach
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 7. April 2011
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2011-020
- Schlagwort(e)
-
committee decision making
fair game forms
fairness
mechanism design
objective equality
social ranking
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since they care more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that all evaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order. The rules must specify for all possible vectors of such vector bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the “payments” for this bid vector and its implied rank order. Three axioms uniquely define the “procedurally fair” ranking rules. We finally discuss how our approach can be adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable candidates.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C70 - General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- URN
- urn:nbn:de:urmel-95dbc570-69ec-40a0-85df-78c8507edcaf8-00205597-14