- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 4
- Does procedural fai...
Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding
concerns? A bidding experiment
- Angeblicher Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 26. Oktober 2010
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2010-073
- Schlagwort(e)
-
Auctions
Fair Division Games
Procedural fairness
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (first versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seeking.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- D44 - Auctions ; C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior