- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 2
- Heterogeneous bids ...
- Autor(in)
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Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- Erschienen
- 1. September 2008
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
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2008-066
- Schlagwort(e)
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Auction
Experiment
Overbidding
Risk-Aversion
Underbidding
- Zusammenfsg.
-
We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data we present and test a theory of constant markdown bids. While a fraction of bidders can be well described by Bayesian Nash equilibrium bids, a larger fraction seems to either use constant markdown bids or seems to rationally optimise against a population where some members use markdown bids and some are rational.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- experimental economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior ; D44 - Auctions