- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 1
- Competition on Comm...
Competition on Common Value Markets with Naive Traders – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis -
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 20. Dezember 2007
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2007-105
- Schlagwort(e)
-
common value auction
experiment
incomplete information
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiring a company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition of both, buyers and sellers. Naıvety of both is related to the idea that higher prices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers increases prices, competition of naive sellers promotes efficiency enhancing trade. Our predictions are tested experimentally.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- experimental economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- D42 - Monopoly ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information