- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 1
- Interregional diver...
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 16. Mai 2007
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2007-16
- Schlagwort(e)
-
cross-cultural experiments
social preferences
ultimatum bargaining
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Does geographic distance or the perceived social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects play a one-shot ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and a passive dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographic scope by involving either one or three different locations in Germany. Observed behavior reflects the robust stylized facts of this class of ultimatum experiments and can be adequately explained by other-regarding preferences. While responder behavior does not condition on co-players' location of residence, self-interest of proposers varies significantly with the latter. Altogether, we do not detect strong discrimination based on geographic distance.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- experimental economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology