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- Tit for Others’ Tat...
Tit for Others’ Tat - Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party
Monitoring and Indirect Punishment
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 1. Oktober 2013
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2013-43
- Schlagwort(e)
-
experiment
monitoring
prisoner’s dilemma
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices by the other pair. Considering this as a four-person infinite horizon game allows for Folk-Theorem-like voluntary cooperation. We ask whether monitoring and indirect punishment with the help of others are comparable to direct monitoring and punishment in establishing and maintaining voluntary cooperation. The treatment effects we find are rather weak. Others’ monitoring of own activities is only an insufficient substitute for direct observability.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations