- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 7
- Procedurally fair c...
Procedurally fair collective provision: its requirements and
experimental functionality
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 10. September 2013
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2013-034
- Schlagwort(e)
-
Bidding behavior
Procedural fairness
Public project
- Zusammenfsg.
-
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects’ costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets