Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome Volume 6 Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-05-07 2012 2007 2012-020 Contest All-pay auction Spending limit Incumbency advantage Experiment This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome in an electoral contest where two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, compete for office in terms of the amount of campaign expenditure. The candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent wins the contest in case of a tie. Theory predicts that in the presence of such asymmetry spending limits put the challenger at a disadvantage and tightening the limits leads to further entrenchment of the incumbent. The experimental results confirmed the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome but yielded partial support to other predictions. jportal_jpjournal_00000016 2012-05-08T13:24:24.919Z 2012-05-08T13:24:09.389Z