- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 6
- Contests with Incum...
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 7. Mai 2012
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2012-020
- Schlagwort(e)
-
All-pay auction
Contest
Experiment
Incumbency advantage
Spending limit
- Zusammenfsg.
-
This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome in an electoral contest where two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, compete for office in terms of the amount of campaign expenditure. The candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent wins the contest in case of a tie. Theory predicts that in the presence of such asymmetry spending limits put the challenger at a disadvantage and tightening the limits leads to further entrenchment of the incumbent. The experimental results confirmed the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome but yielded partial support to other predictions.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior ; D72 - Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior