- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 5
- A Simple Questionna...
- Abgebildete Person
- Erschienen
- 1. Dezember 2011
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
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2011-057
- Schlagwort(e)
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beliefs
best response correspondence
coordination game
questionnaire
risk preferences
- Zusammenfsg.
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This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2 X 2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects’ risk aversion while keeping their beliefs unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the stability of strategy choices in coordination games.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- JEL-Classification for JER
- D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games