Group Identity and Discrimination in Small Markets: Asymmetry of In-Group Favors Volume 5 Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-10-06 2011 2007 2011-043 Group identity Experiments Markets Bargaining We experimentally study the inuence of induced group identity on the determination of prices and beliefs in a small market game. We create group identity through a focal point coordination game. Subjects play a three-person bargaining game where one seller can sell an indivisible good to one of two competing buyers under four different treatments varying the buyer-seller constellation. We find evidence of in group favoritism on the buyer side. However we do not detect a lower ask prices for in-group sellers for in-group buyers, indicating that in-group favoritism is in favor of the more powerful market participant. jportal_jpjournal_00000016 2011-10-06T06:18:02.750Z 2011-10-06T06:17:30.814Z