 Autor
 Erschienen
 Mo, 22. Mrz. 2010
 Nummer des DiscussionPapers

2010018
 Schlagwort(e)

efficiency
equity
experiment
generosity game
 Zusammenfsg.

In twoperson generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for twoperson generosity games show that participants seem to care more for efficiency than for equity. In threeperson generosity games equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out  or at least weakens  efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer's agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.
 article pub. typess JER
 Research article
 article languages JER
 Englisch
 article research fields JER
 experimental economics
 JELClassification for JER
 C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; C91  Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D0  General; D5  General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium