- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 3
- Internal and extern...
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 10. August 2009
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2009-067
- Schlagwort(e)
-
democracy
dictatorship
political competition
transitions
- Zusammenfsg.
-
All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, and from other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competition are substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits citizens by allowing them to replace rent-seeking rulers. But it also weakens these rulers’ incentives to invest. External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration. As a result, citizens are less willing to fight for democracy, and rulers are less eager to oppose it, when external competition is high. In a panel of countries, there are fewer changes towards democracy when states have low GDP relative to their neighbours.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- D72 - Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession