- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 3
- Social Preferences?...
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 11. Mai 2009
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2009-035
- Schlagwort(e)
-
Internet
moral hazard
psychological game theory
reciprocity
reputation
social preferences
- Zusammenfsg.
-
We analyse pricing, e¤ort and tipping decisions in the online service ‘Google Answers’ While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post In line with the related experimental literature we …nd evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent users. Moreover, researchers seem to adjust their e¤ort based on the user’s previous tipping behaviour. An e¢ cient sorting takes place when enough tip history is available. Users known for tipping in the past receive higher e¤ort answers, while users with an established reputation for non-tipping tend to get low e¤ort answers. In addition, we analyse how tipping is adopted when the behavioural default is not to tip and estimate minimum levels for the fraction of genuine reciprocator and imitator types.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- experimental economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C24 - Truncated and Censored Models ; C70 - General ; C93 - Field Experiments ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software