Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism Volume 3 Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-04-20 2009 2007 2009-029 Public goods game Real-time protocol Information feedback Conditional cooperation Simulations This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional procedures because it relies on endogenous cycle lengths, which are defined by the number of contributors a player waits before committing to a further contribution. Based on hypothetical distributions of randomly generated contribution sequences, we provide strong evidence for conditionally cooperative behavior. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time. jportal_jpjournal_00000016 2009-04-20T10:28:49.064Z 2010-12-17T11:53:59.966Z