- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 2
- Distributive fairne...
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 27. März 2008
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2008-028
- Schlagwort(e)
-
cross-national experiment
equity
fairness
redistribution
social preferences
ultimatum bargaining
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Does geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographical scope in that they involve either one or three subject pools which, in the latter case, structurally differ in their between-subject pool heterogeneity. Observed choice behavior corroborates several stylized facts of this class of ultimatum games which are primarily explained by strategic play and other-regarding preferences. While the extent of self-interested allocation behavior in proposers significantly varies across sites, neither proposers nor responders meaningfully condition their choices on their co-players’ provenance or affiliation. Altogether, we do not discern articulate discriminative behavior based on geographic or social distance.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- experimental economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C70 - General ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement