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- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 2
- Effects of Profitab...
Effects of Profitable Downsizing on Collective Bargaining
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 12. Februar 2008
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2008-011
- Schlagwort(e)
-
bargaining
experiment
labor markets
- Zusammenfsg.
-
We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesn’t exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We find that on the aggregate level the proposer’s decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- experimental economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining