- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 1
- Planning ahead: eli...
Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 20. Dezember 2007
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2007-104
- Schlagwort(e)
-
Conditional cooperation
Experiments
Latent-class logit
Public goods games
- Zusammenfsg.
-
In a two-person finitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model specification, we develop a relationship between a player’s beliefs about others’ behavior and his contributions’ plans, and use this relationship to identify the player’s most likely preference “type”. Our estimation analysis indicates that players are heterogeneous in their preferences also at the intentional level. Moreover, our data show that deviations from intended actions are positively related to changes in beliefs, thereby suggesting that people are able to plan.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- experimental economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C70 - General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior ; H41 - Public Goods