- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 1
- A Nash Threat Game ...
- Autor(in)
-
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- Erschienen
- 22. August 2007
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2007-050
- Schlagwort(e)
-
EMU
EU-enlargement
exchange-rate policy
Nash-bargaining solution
threat game
- Zusammenfsg.
-
Following entrance into the European Union, Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) are expected to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). These countries may incur considerable costs over the course of their passing through the required Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II). However, with enough bargaining leverage CEECs may be able to pass some of these costs on to current EMU-members. In turn, a CEEC’s leverage depends on their ability to wield successful brinkmanship via an exchange-rate policy characterized by a ‘threaten-thy-neighbor’ strategy. A two-stage Nash-threat game captures the essentials of the CEECs’ phase of ERM-II pass through.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- public policy
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions