- A-Z
- Jena Economic Resea...
- Volume 1
- Cheap Talk and Secr...
Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiments
- Autor(in)
- Erschienen
- 20. August 2007
- Nummer des Discussion-Papers
-
2007-048
- Schlagwort(e)
-
cheap talk communication
public goods game
real-time protocol
- Zusammenfsg.
-
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.
- article pub. typess JER
- Research article
- article languages JER
- Englisch
- article research fields JER
- experimental economics
- JEL-Classification for JER
- C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief